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INTRODUCTION

Philip Zelikow has provided a fascinating account of how
officials in the U.S. government during the “War on Terror”
authorized torture and cruel treatment of human beings whom
they labeled “high value al Qaeda detainee[s],” “enemy
1
combatants,” or “the worst of the worst.” Professor Zelikow

* Professor, Georgetown Law.
1. Philip Zelikow, Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 22–24
(2012) (providing an in-depth analysis of the decisions made by the Bush Administration
in implementing interrogation policies and practices in the period immediately following
September 11, 2001); see Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
§ 948a(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (2006)) (defining
“unlawful enemy combatant”), invalidated in part by Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723
(2008); Memorandum from Stephen G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent.
Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques
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appears to lay blame primarily on the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), although in truth, there was plenty of blame to go
around.2 CIA officials, without expertise or experience in
interrogation, insisted that they needed to use physical coercion
when, in fact, other methods of interrogation were working—just
not getting them the answers they thought, often wrongly, that
3
they should be hearing. Justice Department lawyers wrote legal
memos that authorized what should have been unthinkable,
twisting the law to conform to what the CIA wanted to do, rather
4
than instructing the CIA to conform its conduct to law. The
officials responsible for policy—including President George Bush,
Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—
apparently failed even to ask the most rudimentary question of
policy: not just whether it is legal to strip captives naked, slam

that May be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee 1, 4–5 (May 10,
2005), available at http://justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bradbury2005-3.pdf (conducting a
legal analysis of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) interrogation techniques for a
“high value” detainee); Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of
Def., to Sec’y of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1–4
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf
(explaining the procedure for determining “enemy combatant” classification); Katharine
Q. Seelye, Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2002, at A14 (quoting Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for the characterization
of the detainees at Guantánamo Bay as “the worst of the worst” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
2. Zelikow, supra note 1, at 11, 26–27; see also S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH
CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, at xix (Comm.
Print 2008) (discussing the approval of “aggressive interrogation techniques” by Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld and other senior officials at the Department of Defense);
Memorandum from Behavioral Analysis Unit, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Raymond
S. Mey et al., Counterterrorism Gen. Counsel, GTMO-INTEL 2 (May 30, 2003), available
at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/022306/1261.pdf (discussing the willingness
of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Humint Services to use questionable
interrogation techniques).
3. See INDEP. PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DET. OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 7–8 (2004) (reporting that
“authorities at Guantanamo requested approval of stronger interrogation techniques to
counter tenacious resistance by some detainees”); James P. Terry, Torture and the
Interrogation of Detainees, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 595, 598–99 (2010) (noting the dissent
among government officials over the use of enhanced interrogation techniques when prior
methods of questioning produced similar results); Philip Zelikow, Legal Policy for a
Twilight War, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 89, 104 (2007) (explaining that “the CIA had little
organizational capability or experience in the interrogation of hostile captives”);
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda
Operative 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf.
4. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., supra note 2, at xxvi–xxvii (concluding that the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel memos “distorted the meaning and intent
of anti-torture laws, [and] rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody”).
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them against walls, hit them repeatedly, force them into painful
stress positions for hours at a time, and suffocate them through
waterboarding, but whether it is good policy to do so.5 And, by all
accounts, no one in a position of responsibility seems to have
asked whether the tactics authorized were moral or consistent
with our fundamental constitutional values.
II. TORTURE AND CRUELTY: A MATTER OF LAW OR POLICY?
I agree with Professor Zelikow that the question of what is
legal and the question of what is the right thing to do as a policy
6
matter are not identical. The fact that Justice Department
lawyers opined that waterboarding and other patently abusive
tactics were “legal”7 should not have ended the discussion; it
should at most have started the discussion. Professor Zelikow
persuasively demonstrates that the policy case against adopting
such tactics was and is strong: torture brings unclear benefits (as
no one can truly know whether information obtained through
torture could not have been obtained in some other way) and
imposes clear, historically demonstrated costs.8 It delegitimizes
the state that tortures, provides the best recruitment propaganda
the enemy could possibly hope for, compromises cooperation with
much of the rest of the world’s law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, and erects nearly insuperable barriers to prosecuting
those we torture for their own terrorist acts.9 It also, I might add,
debases our culture and violates our own first principles. In the
words of John McCain, “it is not about who they are[;] [i]t is about

5. See id. at xiii–xv (explaining that Department of Defense officials sought to use
the interrogation techniques employed in the Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape
training programs); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1167, 1225–26 (2005) (showing that policy questions were excluded from
consideration in analyzing the legality of the CIA’s interrogation methods); Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Howard L. Rosenberg & Ariane de Vogue, Sources: Top Bush Advisors
Approved
‘Enhanced
Interrogation,’
ABCNEWS
(Apr.
9,
2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=4583256&page=1 (explaining that
the “Principals Committee” that approved interrogation techniques included top Bush
Administration officials).
6. Zelikow, supra note 1, at 5.
7. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 3, at 18.
8. See Zelikow, supra note 1, at 27–29, 36 (explaining that a policy analysis of the
proposed interrogation techniques would have shown “significant intelligence costs from
tormenting prisoners”).
9. See Jeannine Bell, “Behind This Mortal Bone”: The (In)Effectiveness of Torture,
83 IND. L.J. 339, 356–57 (2008) (contrasting studies showing the effectiveness of torture
compared to other interrogation techniques); Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in
Response to Terrorism Can Pose Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
5201, 5209–17 (2009) (analyzing the unintended consequences of U.S. interrogation and
counterterrorism policies that permitted the torture of detainees).
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who we are.”10 These latter concerns may partake of morality
rather than policy, but they are equally important concerns. So
Professor Zelikow is certainly correct that even if the tactics the
Bush Administration authorized were legal, there were many
good policy arguments against adopting them.
Professor Zelikow faults the high-level officials who
approved of these tactics—who, as far as we know, included at
least Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Ashcroft, Gonzales, and
11
Rice. He writes with a great deal of empathy for the pressures
these and other officials were under and, at times, seems to
suggest that the combination of the CIA’s claim that their
interrogators needed to employ these tactics, the Justice
Department’s assurance that the tactics were legal, and the
perceived mandate to do everything necessary to avert another
attack left these officials with no real choice.12 Yet, at other times,
Professor Zelikow seems to imply that if there had been a policy
review, rather than merely a legal and operational assessment,
13
the result might have come out differently.
I’m not convinced of the latter point. After all, it is not as if
the policy arguments Professor Zelikow marshals were or are
new, hard to find, or difficult to understand. They have been
advanced for decades in debates about torture. They are reflected

10. 151 CONG. REC. 17,233 (2005) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (emphasis
added).
11. Zelikow, supra note 1, at 22–27; Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay:
Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules (Part I): Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 65 (2008) (statement of Marjorie Cohn, Professor of Law, Thomas
Jefferson School of Law, President, National Lawyers Guild) (stating that “Dick Cheney,
Condole[e]zza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, George Tenet and John Ashcroft met
in the White House and micromanaged the torture by approving . . . waterboarding”);
Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President Bush,
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict
with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 118
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
12. See Zelikow, supra note 1, at 23–24 (discussing the events leading up to the
decision by President Bush to approve the use of harsh interrogation techniques); see also
Bybee Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1–2 (explaining to CIA officials that waterboarding
would not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2340A); Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen.
Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee
Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees 1–2
(July
20,
2007)
[hereinafter
Bradbury
Memorandum],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-warcrimesact.pdf (explaining the CIA’s position that
the use of interrogation methods such as waterboarding were “necessary . . . to obtain
critical intelligence” and “assist in preventing future terrorist attacks”).
13. Zelikow, supra note 1, at 29–30 (raising possible policy objections against the
use of coercive interrogation methods).
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in the findings of official commissions that have studied the use
of torture and other coercive interrogation tactics in such
countries as the United Kingdom and Israel.14 The United States
consulted and worked closely with these countries as it developed
its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11.15 The
arguments, in other words, did not need to be put in a policy
memorandum to be considered. They were in the very air that the
modern legal and intelligence world breathes. It is not credible that
Rice, Gonzales, Tenet, Bush, and Cheney were not familiar with
these policy arguments. It seems much more likely that they simply
were not convinced. In their calculus, the costs were worth the
putative benefits—one benefit being, no doubt, that they could say
that they took “tough” measures in order to do “everything they
could” to protect Americans. So while Professor Zelikow is correct
that the question of what is the right thing to do should not be
reduced to whether a particular option is legal,16 he overestimates
the role that these policy arguments might have played.
More importantly, Professor Zelikow too quickly moves from
law to policy. The Bush Administration did not simply adopt a
bad policy option; it affirmatively violated the law. Torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of prisoners are not
just bad policy options—they are illegal. Indeed, the purpose of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits all
17
cruel and humiliating treatment of detainees, and of the

14. See HCJ, 5100/94, 4054/95, 6536/95, 5188/96, 7563/97, 7628/97, 1043/99
Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service’s Interrogation
Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1473, 1477–89 [1999] (Isr.) (discussing the legality of
interrogation methods employed by the Israeli General Security Service and the policy
implications examined by the Commission of Inquiry); COMMITTEE OF PRIVY
COUNSELLORS, REPORT TO CONSIDER AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION
OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM, 1972, Cm. 4901, at 1–8 (U.K.) (examining
whether the interrogation techniques inflicted upon suspected terrorists comport with
international human rights obligations).
15. KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22030, U.S.-EU COOPERATION
AGAINST TERRORISM 3 (2011); see Robert D. Blackwill & Walter B. Slocombe, A True Ally
in the Middle East, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2011, at A13 (discussing the U.S.–Israel
relationship in combating terrorism); Daniel B. Shapiro, U.S. Ambassador to Isr., Address
at the Institute of National Strategic Studies (Sept. 8, 2011), available at
http://israel.usembassy.gov/amb09082011.html (explaining that the “close U.S.-Israel
relationship proved invaluable to American officials aiming to establish the most efficient
and reliable counter-terrorism posture”).
16. Zelikow, supra note 1, at 5; see Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and
International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 57, 74–75 (2009) (explaining that the Bush Administration failed to take
into account moral and policy questions embodied in the Geneva Conventions).
17. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention, Common art. 3].
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Convention Against Torture (CAT), which prohibits both torture
and “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,”18 is to take these
options off the policy table. It is true, of course, that the fact that
an initiative is legal does not necessarily resolve whether it is
good policy. But the more critical point here was the obverse: the
fact that an option is illegal does necessarily resolve (by
pretermitting) the policy question—cruelty and torture are
simply not available policy options.
The Bush Administration went wrong in the torture
controversy not just in choosing the wrong policy, but in violating
the law. And not just any law. The norm against torture and
cruel treatment of detainees, in or outside of war, is as
fundamental a legal and moral precept as mankind has ever
identified. International law treats the prohibition on torture as
having the status of jus cogens, reserved for those few
fundamental prohibitions that can never justifiably be
19
contravened—like genocide or slavery. There are plenty of
policy arguments against genocide. But we would not say that
Hitler’s error was that he failed to entertain the full range of
policy considerations raised by exterminating the Jews.
Because the tactics deployed violated the law, a major share
of responsibility for the United States’ descent into torture and
cruelty must be laid at the feet of the lawyers—in the first
instance, John Ashcroft as Attorney General; Alberto Gonzales as
White House counsel; David Addington, Legal Counsel to the
Vice President; and John Yoo and Jay Bybee, the lawyers in the
Office of Legal Counsel who wrote the first memos authorizing
these tactics.20 But the blame should not stop there. Any lawyer

18. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009) (defining jus cogens as “[a]
mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by
the international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”); see, e.g.,
Graham Ogilvy, Belhas v. Ya’alon: The Case for a Jus Cogens Exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 176 (2009) (“The Nuremberg trials
following World War II outlined many crimes that have traditionally been held to be
violations of jus cogens norms; genocide, enslavement, and other inhuman acts were found
to be so offensive to the human condition, they subjected the Nuremberg defendants to
the jurisdiction of the court regardless of Germany’s assent to the authority of the
tribunal. U.S. courts, as well as international treaties, have long recognized the
prohibition against torture as part of customary international law, and have since come to
consider it a peremptory norm.” (footnote omitted)).
20. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NO HIGHER HONOR 104–05 (2011); Jordan J. Paust,
Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 827 (2005); Scott Shane & David Johnston, Lawyers Agreed on the
Legality of Brutal Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009, at A1.
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worth his salt who was advising on these issues should have
recognized that these tactics were illegal—so you’d have to
include William Haynes II, General Counsel to the Department
of Defense; John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel to the CIA; John
Bellinger, who was advising National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice when she approved the tactics; and the many
lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel who allowed the tactics to
continue under their watch—including Jack Goldsmith, Daniel
Levin, and Stephen Bradbury.21 Why was it that not one of these
lawyers was willing to say no to patent cruelty and torture?
Goldsmith came closest; he temporarily suspended authorization
for waterboarding after the CIA Inspector General reported that
its application had gone beyond that authorized in the August
2002 memo.22 But Goldsmith did not suspend approval for any of
the other cruel, inhuman, and degrading tactics.23 And the review
process he shepherded ultimately produced a 2004 Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum signed by Dan Levin, Goldsmith’s
successor, that used more politic language than John Yoo but
secretly authorized the CIA to continue to use all the same
tactics Yoo and Bybee had initially approved.24
Why should it have been obvious that these tactics were
illegal? I have analyzed the legal arguments in detail in my book,
25
The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable, so I’ll just
touch on them briefly here. In order to give the CIA the green

21. RICE, supra note 20, at 104; Kai Ambos, Prosecuting Guantánamo in Europe:
Can and Shall the Masterminds of the “Torture Memos” Be Held Criminally Responsible
on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction?, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 405, 406 (2009); Daniel
Kanstroom, Introduction: Law, Torture, and the “Task of the Good Lawyer”—Mukasey
Agonistes, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 191 (2009); Shane & Johnston, supra note
20; Bybee Memorandum, supra note 3, at 11.
22. Ruth Blakeley, Dirty Hands, Clean Conscience? The CIA Inspector General’s
Investigation of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” in the War on Terror and the
Torture Debate, 10 J. HUM. RTS. 544, 553–54 (2011); Shane & Johnston, supra note 20.
23. Shane & Johnston, supra note 20.
24. See generally Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (describing torture in vague
terms and arguing that specific intent would be “unlikely” to be found “if an individual
acted in good faith, and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct
would not inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering”); see also M. Katherine B.
Darmer, Waterboarding and the Legacy of the Bybee-Yoo “Torture and Power”
Memorandum: Reflections from a Temporary Yoo Colleague and Erstwhile Bush
Administration Apologist, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 639, 647–48 (2009) (arguing that the Levin
memo allowed for the tactics approved by Yoo in 2002 to continue); Shane & Johnston,
supra note 20.
25. See generally THE TORTURE MEMOS 19–31 (David Cole ed., 2009) (arguing that
the “Torture Memos” misapplied the law in order to justify torture).
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light, the Justice Department first had to find that none of these
tactics constituted torture. The initial August 2002 memo did
that by reasoning that torture is limited to the specifically
intended infliction of extreme pain of the kind associated with
organ failure or death.26 Any pain short of that would not be
torture, and under the “specific intent” requirement, even the
infliction of pain reaching or exceeding that level would not be
torture if the interrogator intended to inflict pain just short of
that line.27 (What, by the way, is the level of pain associated
with death? Surely it is fundamentally unknowable, as we
cannot ask dead people how they would rate their pain on a
scale of one to ten. Moreover, general observation would tell us
that some people die in terrible pain, while others seem to die
at peace, almost painlessly.)
The August 2002 memo further argued that even if pain of
sufficient severity to constitute torture was inflicted, the
President as Commander in Chief could not be constrained by
law in how he chooses to engage the enemy; in other words,
that when it comes to directing interrogation of the enemy, he
28
is above the law. And the August 2002 memo argued that an
interrogator who tortured could invoke self-defense, even if he
faced no imminent threat from the man strapped to the
waterboard and virtually choking to death.29 Arguments like
these should have set off alarm bells. They did not—at least
not until they were leaked to the Washington Post and
disclosed to the public.30 Once the August 2002 memo became
31
public, the Administration felt obliged to retract it. The fact
that they could not for a moment defend in public what they
had all accepted without question in secret is compelling
evidence that they failed to meet their ethical responsibilities
as lawyers.
But that is not all. The lawyers also had to get around the
fact that the CAT and the Geneva Conventions, both treaties
that the United States helped draft and has signed and ratified,

26. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf.
27. Id. at 3–4.
28. Id. at 33–39.
29. Id. at 42–46.
30. See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1
J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 462–63 (2005).
31. Id.
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make lesser forms of abuse illegal.32 The CAT prohibits any
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”33 Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions bars any “cruel” or “humiliating”
34
treatment. Even if you think stripping a suspect naked,
slamming him into walls, forcing him into painful stress
positions, and waterboarding him is not torture, can anyone
claim with a straight face that these tactics are not cruel, not
inhuman, not degrading, and not humiliating? Would we ever
accept such an argument if these tactics were employed against
our troops? Initially, the Administration’s lawyers sought to
avoid these more capacious legal prohibitions by simply declaring
that they did not apply.35 But when the Supreme Court ruled, in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, that Common Article 3 applies to al Qaeda
detainees,36 and when it became clear that Congress would
reaffirm, in the McCain Amendment, that the prohibition on
“cruel, inhuman, and degrading” treatment applies to detainees
held abroad,37 the Justice Department’s lawyers opined that the
tactics did not even contravene these prohibitions, either
38
independently or even when imposed in combination.
The painfully strained character of these arguments
reveals, in my view, that the lawyers failed to do their job. The
job of a government lawyer is to say “no” when the law
precludes a policy option that government officials would like
to pursue. It is to measure the government’s desired initiative
against the law objectively, to ensure that government action
32. See CAT, supra note 18, at 195; Third Geneva Convention, Common art. 3,
supra note 17, at 3516; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 79–81 (2005) (discussing how officials were able to
rationalize the definition of torture that the government adopted with the one contained
in the Geneva Conventions and the CAT).
33. CAT, supra note 18, at 114, 116.
34. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
35. See Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, “Protected Person”
Status in Occupied Iraq Under the Fourth Geneva Convention 23 (Mar. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/
gc4mar18.pdf.
36. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–30 (2006).
37. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2739,
2739 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)); MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22312, INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES: OVERVIEW OF THE
MCCAIN AMENDMENT 1 (2006).
38. Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the
C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/
17detain.html. See generally Bradbury Memorandum, supra note 12, at 11–14, 75
(concluding that the CIA’s interrogation techniques do not violate the War Crimes Act or
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention).
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conforms to the law, and not the other way around. In this
instance, however, rather than holding the CIA to the dictates
of the law, the lawyers perverted the law to rationalize the
indefensible.
Responsibility, however, is not limited to the lawyers. It
also lies with the Cabinet-level officials who signed off on the
policy—including Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Tenet, and Rice.
These officials were not lawyers, but that is hardly an excuse on
a matter such as this. The tactics employed were patently illegal.
If Nixon’s lawyers told him it was legal to break into the
Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate, or if Clinton’s
lawyers told him it was legal to lie under oath about his sexual
affairs, would that be a defense? Some things speak for
themselves. This is in that category.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGAL VIOLATIONS
What does it matter, one might ask, whether the mistake
was one of policy, as Professor Zelikow maintains, or of law, as
I argue? We both agree that it was wrong, so why bicker about
the details? The distinction is critical for this reason: if the
decision to authorize the infliction of cruelty on helpless
detainees was wrong only as a matter of policy, it leaves the
question of whether to do so in the future an open one. Under
some other set of circumstances, or perhaps more to the point,
for another set of decisionmakers, the policy considerations
might come out differently. If, by contrast, torture and cruelty
were not just a mistake of policy, but illegal, these options
would be off the table. And that is precisely where they should
be.
Whether one views the more than five-year descent into
official cruelty and torture as a bad policy judgment, illegal
conduct, or both may also affect how the nation responds. In
either event, an error of that magnitude and gravity warrants
some sort of official review. But if, as I argue above, the
conduct was affirmatively unlawful, the nation is obligated to
pursue some sort of accountability. The rule of law means little
if the nation’s highest officials can violate it in secret for more
than five years, brag about it in public once they leave office,
and face no consequences whatsoever. Yet that is where we
now apparently stand. The President and Vice President have
admitted in their memoirs and book tours to personally
authorizing illegal cruelty over an extended period of time, yet

Do Not Delete

2012]

4/8/2012 2:44 AM

THE TAINT OF TORTURE

63

the United States has done nothing to hold them accountable.39
I do not believe that criminal prosecution is the right way to
go—absent further evidence coming to light—largely because, for
some of the reasons Professor Zelikow has identified, I can
understand (even if I cannot condone) how decisions like this
might have been made by persons acting in what they thought
was the best interest of the nation and not in their own narrow
self-interest. Prosecutorial discretion is built into the criminal
law for a reason. Not every crime needs to be prosecuted.
But some sort of official accountability is nonetheless
critical. My own view is that an official nonpartisan blue-ribbon
commission, much like the 9/11 Commission Professor Zelikow
directed, would be the best way to proceed.40 Some sort of
congressional statement might also be warranted. Civil suits
holding individuals liable for monetary damages and
establishing that the conduct was illegal would be another
vehicle. Even review of the lawyers’ misconduct by bar
associations would be something. What is unacceptable,
however, is the current collective failure to engage in any
accountability undertaking. And I do mean to call it a
collective failure, because if we, as the American people, let our
leaders do this without any effort to hold them to account, we
become complicit.
Other countries have managed to pursue accountability
through commissions of inquiry. When the United Kingdom, in
its early responses to Irish Republican Army violence, adopted
widespread administrative detention and used physical coercion
to compel detainees to talk, the Prime Minister appointed a
committee, headed by a former Law Lord, Lord Parker, to
investigate and report on the matter.41 Within a year, the Parker
Committee issued its report, detailing what had happened and
42
concluding that the use of cruel and coercive tactics was illegal.
Similarly, when Canadian citizen Maher Arar was rendered to

39. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 170 (2010) (describing Bush’s decision
to approve “enhanced interrogation techniques” on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed); DICK
CHENEY WITH LIZ CHENEY, IN MY TIME 358–63 (2011) (describing Cheney’s viewing of
photographs of Americans abusing Iraqi detainees yet seeking not to hold anyone
accountable).
40. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT, at xiii, xv (2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/report/
911Report.pdf.
41. COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS, supra note 14, at 1–3.
42. See id. at 21 (asserting that deviating from the Geneva Convention will “both
gravely damage [the United Kingdom’s] reputation and deal a severe blow to the whole
world movement to improve Human Rights”).
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Syria by U.S. officials on the basis of erroneous information that
Canadian authorities had provided, Canada established a
commission, again headed by an esteemed judge, to investigate
the matter.43 The Arar Commission issued a 1,200 page report,
exonerating Arar and condemning Canadian officials’ roles in the
affair.44 The Canadian Parliament issued a formal apology to
Arar, and Canada paid Arar 11.5 million Canadian dollars for
the injuries he sustained.45 No one went to prison in either the
United Kingdom or in Canada, but these commissions played a
critical role in officially accounting for what went wrong and in
labeling it illegal. That process in turn can help to shape the
legal culture around torture and to reduce the chance that it will
happen again. In the United Kingdom, there is today a broad
consensus that torture is never justifiable.46 By contrast, here in
the United States polls frequently reflect an evenly divided
47
response on whether torture is sometimes warranted. As
things now stand in the United States, torture remains a
policy option.
IV. THE LAW AND POLICY OF DETENTION AND TARGETING
The role of law and policy with respect to detention and
targeting is more complicated than with respect to torture and
cruelty. Here, there is no absolute prohibition. In peacetime,
detention without charges and summary execution are, of course,
generally impermissible, short of exceptional circumstances like
quarantine or self-defense, respectively. But in an armed conflict,
detention and killing without trial are routine. Indeed, they are
the two principal mechanisms for incapacitating the enemy. So
unlike torture and cruel treatment, which have no place in war
or peace, detention and targeting have a legitimate place in
wartime. The difficulty is in defining what that place is and
where the boundaries lie between war and peace.

43. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR 14 (2006).
44. Id. at 28, 35, 362–63.
45. Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5.
46. See The ‘Ticking Bomb’ Problem, BBC, http://bbc.co.uk/ethics/torture/ethics/
tickingbomb_1.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (“In Britain, 72% oppose torture in any
circumstances—a reflection of the strong antipathy towards such practices in Western
Europe.”).
47. See Americans Divided on Justifying Torture, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION
(June 11, 2009), http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/36304/americans_divided_on_justifying_
torture/ (providing results from a telephone interview poll illustrating that Americans are
divided on what circumstances may justify the use of torture).
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As with torture and cruelty, detention and targeting raise
both legal and policy questions. Even if indefinite detention and
targeted killings are legally justifiable under certain
circumstances, there may be sound policy reasons not to use
those tactics. But what is critical, above all, is that these
exercises of official power be guided by law, not just by policy.
The central flaw in the Bush Administration’s initial detention
program at Guantánamo was precisely that it sought to evade
law. The prison was built in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in part
because the Administration thought it was beyond the reach of
48
American law. The Administration denied that the Geneva
Conventions applied to al Qaeda detainees.49 It fiercely resisted
50
calls for fair hearings and judicial review. When the Supreme
Court interpreted the habeas corpus statute to govern the
indefinite detention of human beings held at Guantánamo,51
the Administration convinced Congress to amend that law to
deny the detainees habeas corpus.52 Habeas corpus is nothing
less than the vehicle by which law is brought to bear on
53
detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court ruled that, even
acting together, Congress and the President could not place
detainees at Guantánamo beyond the law.54
The Guantánamo detention policies are now a matter of
public record, governed by law, largely because the Supreme
Court held that the detainees could challenge their detentions in
court.55 The subsequent habeas proceedings have created a
jurisprudence of detention in which the Administration has had

48. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497–98 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today,
the Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of
the federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their
jurisdiction—and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime
detainees.”); Tamara L. Huckert, The Undetermined Fate of the Guantanamo Bay
Detainees’ Habeas Corpus Petitions, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 236, 237 (2006).
49. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 35, at 23.
50. See Peter Irons, “The Constitution Is Just a Scrap of Paper”: Empire Versus
Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1096–98 (2005).
51. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
52. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600,
2635–36 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006)), invalidated in part by
Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723 (2008); JAMES P. PFIFFNER, POWER PLAY: THE BUSH
PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION 108 (2008).
53. See Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 785 (recognizing the applicability of habeas corpus
rights to various forms of proceedings).
54. See id. at 765 (“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power
to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its
terms apply.”).
55. Id. at 771.
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to defend its position in public and under law.56 As I have argued
in some detail elsewhere,57 there is a lawful role for preventive
detention in the ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda and the
Taliban taking place in Afghanistan and the border regions of
Pakistan. But the scope of that authority is a complex question,
requiring imperfect analogies to established principles of
humanitarian law governing traditional armed conflicts. The fact
that those questions are now being addressed in a relatively
transparent legal process has brought our detention policy,
initially lawless, under law.
Killing the enemy is also permissible during armed conflict,
but must be guided by law. Obama Administration officials have
twice addressed the issue of targeted killings in public, and both
times they have maintained that the government is acting
lawfully in its use of force and, in particular, abiding by the laws
58
of war. The government’s targeted killing policy, however,
remains secret, leaving many questions about its legality
59
unanswered. How far does the targeting authority extend
beyond the battlefield? To Yemen? Somalia? Elsewhere? Who can
the President target? Can the President order the killing of foot
soldiers for Al Shabab in Somalia, for example, even if they have
never attacked the United States and are not particularly hostile
to us, simply because some elements of Al Shabab may be
sympathetic to al Qaeda? Does the government first have to
exhaust alternative nonlethal means of incapacitation, such as
capture?
56. See id. at 732; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006); Richard M.
Pious, Prerogative Power in the Obama Administration: Continuity and Change in the
War on Terrorism, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 263, 265 (2011).
57. See generally David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected
Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 711 (2009).
58. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security:
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-obrennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an
(“International
legal
principles, including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose
important constraints on our ability to act unilaterally—and on the way in which we can
use force—in foreign territories.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (“[I]t is the considered view of this
Administration—and it has certainly been my experience during my time as Legal
Adviser—that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use
of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”
(emphasis omitted)).
59. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1.
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What does it mean to claim that capture is not “feasible”?
That it is impossible or just that capture would be too costly?
Who measures the acceptable cost? On the battlefield, one is not
required to exhaust all possibilities of capture; killing is
permissible unless the enemy affirmatively and unambiguously
surrenders or is hors de combat. But does an “exhaustion”
requirement apply beyond the battlefield, in such places as
Yemen or Somalia?
Must targeted killing be limited to stopping imminent
attacks? If so, how is imminence defined? The Administration
has suggested that imminence applies more loosely with respect
to clandestine terrorist organizations; it is enough that they have
the inclination to attack us at any time, and there need not be
any actual immediate threat posed at the time the targeted
60
killing is carried out. But that would appear to define away the
“imminence” requirement altogether, as any al Qaeda target
would by definition pose an “imminent” threat. Finally, if we can
agree on what the substantive criteria for killing in this armed
conflict are, what processes are in place to minimize the risk that
U.S. officials do not target the wrong people? (As the release of
more than 600 of the 779 people once held at Guantánamo has
shown, accurate determinations of combatant status are a
challenge in the murky world of war with a clandestine
organization.)61
These are all difficult questions. But one thing should be
clear: they are all legal questions. The authority of the President
to kill human beings by remote control halfway across the world
60. Brennan, supra note 58 (“[A] more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ may be
appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, in part because threats posed by nonstate actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more
traditional conflicts.”); see Savage, supra note 59 (describing the secret Office of Legal
Counsel memo on the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki that took a broad view of an
“imminent” threat).
61. See Charlie Savage, William Glaberson & Andrew W. Lehren, Details of Lives in
an American Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1; James Warren, Chicago Lawyers
Caught
Between
Clients
and
Country,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/us/08cncwarren.html?_r=1. As this article was going
to press, Attorney General Eric Holder gave a speech disclosing further details regarding
the Administration’s legal theory for killing U.S. citizens abroad. Eric Holder, U.S.
Attorney Gen., Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
This speech offered the most extensive public defense of the Administration’s targeted
policy, but still left many questions unanswered. See David Cole, An Executive Power to
Kill?,
NEW
YORK
REVIEW
BLOG
(Mar.
6,
2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/mar/06/targeted-killings-holder-speech/. The
Office of Legal Counsel legal memorandum that reportedly authorized the killing of
American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki remains secret, so many of the details of the policy
remain obscure.
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must be guided by law. The Obama Administration has claimed
that its actions are fully consistent with the laws of war, as its
lawyers understand them and as they apply to this relatively
novel context.62 But the policy and its asserted justification
remain veiled in secrecy. Our President recently successfully
ordered the killing of a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, yet we do
not even know under what legal authority he did so, or whether
and to what extent that authority would allow him to order the
killing of any of us.63 In a democracy ruled by law, one man
cannot have secret power to kill. If such an awesome power is
indeed to be guided by law, and it must be, that law must be
public. Yet, the Administration has refused to confirm or deny
even that it has ordered targeted killings and has, therefore,
refused to make public the legal memoranda that govern its
practice.64
There is a place for secrecy, of course. Particular initiatives
must often be carried out in secret if they are to have any chance
of success. But if we are a government of laws, then the general
contours, substantive criteria, and procedural requirements of a
program to kill should be a matter of public knowledge so that
the citizenry, and indeed the world at large, can debate and
assess them. This is important not only internally as a matter of
democracy, but also externally, for our secrecy sets a dangerous
precedent and breeds distrust. At the moment we hold a near
monopoly on drones. But that will not last. Other countries have
seen what drones can do and are seeking to develop their own.65
If we think the use of drones by other nations should be governed
by law, we should not be secretive about the limits international
law imposes on us in using drones.
A transparent policy on drones is also critical to building
trust and checking anti-American sentiment. The drone practice
has caused widespread resentment among the populace in
Pakistan.66 The vision of U.S. planes constantly flying overhead,

62. Koh, supra note 58 (“We in the Obama Administration have worked hard since
we entered office to ensure that we conduct all aspects of these armed conflicts—in
particular, detention operations, targeting, and prosecution of terrorist suspects—in a
manner consistent not just with the applicable laws of war, but also with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.”).
63. Savage, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. Scott Shane, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at
A5.
66. Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, Yemen Strike Reflects U.S. Shift to Drones as
Cheaper War Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at A1.
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ready to drop missiles at will, pursuant to a secret policy,67 does
not facilitate trust in the United States. If the policy were
transparent and subject to public scrutiny, it might help build
the trust the United States so desperately needs if it is to prevail
in the long run in the struggle against opponents who use
terrorism.
As with interrogation, the fact that detention and targeting
must be guided by law does not mean that there are not also
critically important policy questions raised by these measures.
Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence under Obama, has
argued that unilateral drone attacks in Pakistan have become so
counterproductive, because the attacks are so widely resented,
that we should abandon unilateral attacks there altogether.68
That is a policy argument, not a legal argument. It is an
important argument, just as are the policy arguments Professor
Zelikow has advanced.
But I think it is equally, if not more important, that the
state’s resort to force and coercion be guided by law. That means
the law will sometimes foreclose policy options. That also means
that when we violate the law, we must pursue some form of
accountability. And it means that when our government claims
the authority to lock up human beings indefinitely without
charges or trial, or to kill them outright, its authority to do so
must be clearly and transparently constrained by law, publically
set forth and defended. Many of the worst mistakes of the past
decade could have been avoided had we not, in the name of policy
ends, sought to evade the strictures of law.

67. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN
AGE OF TERROR 67–68 (2005) (arguing for the U.S. targeted killing policy to be in the
public view); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Killing Awlaki Was Illegal, Immoral and Dangerous,
CNNWORLD (Oct. 1, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/01/killingawlaki-was-illegal-immoral-and-dangerous/ (raising questions about the use of drones and
targeted killing).
68. Dennis C. Blair, Drones Alone Are Not the Answer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, at
A21.

